🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the risk of side-channel leakage in encrypted cloud-based LLM traffic, where fragmented existing evidence hinders reproducibility and comparison. To this end, it constructs the first unified cross-scenario measurement benchmark encompassing both user interactions and multi-agent executions. By extracting traffic signature features solely from encrypted packet metadata, the authors employ machine learning classifiers to systematically evaluate passive attack risks and validate defensive robustness under conditions such as prompt reconstruction and decoding temperature variations. Experimental results demonstrate identification accuracies of 97.7%, 76.7%, and 90.7% for model fingerprinting, prompt categorization, and multi-agent task recognition, respectively. Notably, the findings confirm that single-agent traffic suffices for detecting task fingerprints, thereby providing a systematic quantitative foundation for assessing privacy and security vulnerabilities in LLM traffic.
📝 Abstract
Cloud-based Large language model (LLM) services create a network-level traffic side channel that can expose model, prompt, and task behavior despite encryption. From packet sizes, directions, timing, and burst structure alone, a passive local observer can infer the serving model, the user's prompt category, and the task executed by a collaborative multi-agent system. Yet current evidence is fragmented across separate datasets and settings, limiting reproducibility and comparison. We present, to our knowledge, the first unified measurement study and public benchmark of encrypted LLM traffic across both user--LLM and multi-agent executions. The large-scale benchmark contains 60,000 user--LLM interactions across 10 models and 6 prompt categories, plus 2,838 multi-agent executions covering 10 task categories and two coordination topologies. Using only encrypted packet metadata, we assess the risk of traffic analysis attack by characterizing traffic signatures, identifying the features most associated with leakage, and testing robustness under prompt reformulation, decoding-temperature changes, larger candidate model sets, and partial traffic observation. Model fingerprinting achieves 97.7\% balanced accuracy, prompt-category fingerprinting reaches 76.7\% mean accuracy, and multi-agent task fingerprinting achieves up to 90.7\% accuracy. Prompt reformulation weakens but does not remove model-specific leakage, and task fingerprints remain detectable even from a single agent's traffic.