🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates the privacy risks arising from electromagnetic side-channel leakage due to dual-adversary collaboration in electronic voting systems. Exploiting the ability of video signal electromagnetic emanations to penetrate physical barriers, we propose a cross-space collaborative attack model wherein two adversaries employ software-defined radio (SDR) to capture and reconstruct ballot interface information through walls, subsequently correlating specific ballot contents with individual voters by integrating temporal side-channel observations. Experimental results successfully validate the feasibility of this attack, exposing significant electromagnetic radiation vulnerabilities inherent in official voting interfaces. Furthermore, this work provides critical defensive recommendations for hardening the security of government electronic voting systems against such sophisticated side-channel threats.
📝 Abstract
In this work, we show how two adversaries (Eve and Mallory) can coordinate an electromagnetic side-channel attack to recon- struct the vote displayed on an e-voting machine (EVM) and link it to a specific voter (Alice). Assuming that Eve has access to a place adjacent to the e-polling room (e.g., restroom, unsupervised room), she performs vote reconstruction by intercepting un- intended electromagnetic emanations associated with the video signal. Meanwhile, Mallory observes when Alice is voting and reports this information to Eve over the Internet. To validate the most critical stage of the attack, we conduct a software-defined radio experiment using the official Brazilian e-voting interface and demonstrate through-wall vote reconstruction. Although conventional monitors are employed rather than official EVMs, our findings provide insights into information forensics and support security recommendations for government authorities responsible for e-voting systems.