Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model

2026-09-24

AI Summary

This study investigates political polarization arising from restricted voter participation in the Hotelling-Downs model under high voting costs. Methodologically, it constructs a partial participation game model and employs equilibrium analysis alongside sensitivity testing to demonstrate that the inverse hazard rate serves as the core mechanism driving polarization. The model is further extended by incorporating parameters for voter alienation and electoral competitiveness. The primary contributions lie in elucidating how the cost distribution shapes equilibrium polarization and in proving that these findings remain robust upon integrating realistic factors. Ultimately, this work provides a solid theoretical foundation and novel perspectives for understanding polarization phenomena in electoral contexts.

Abstract

We study a partial-participation variation of the Hotelling-Downs model. Voters each have a cost to vote, and only vote when the comparative gain from their preferred candidate exceeds the cost. Under this model the median voter theorem breaks, and we study the extent of polarization under equilibria in different voters and cost distributions. We find that the main predictor of polarization is the reverse-hazard-rate of the cost distribution, indicating that the driver of polarization under our model is the willingness of voters to respond to changes in positions of candidates. We then extend the model by adding parameters governing alienation and candidate competitiveness, showing that our results are robust even when taking into account other realistic factors.

Problem

• Hotelling-Downs model
• costly voting
• political polarization
• partial participation
• median voter theorem

Innovation

• Costly Voting
• Hotelling-Downs Model
• Polarization
• Reverse-Hazard-Rate
• Partial Participation