Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences
🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates whether winning committees produced by Bloc voting under single-peaked preferences satisfy extended forms of the multiwinner Condorcet criterion. Combining theoretical analysis with Monte Carlo simulations, it systematically characterizes the adjacency property of winning committees under this mechanism, establishes sufficient conditions for its validity, and evaluates compliance with several Condorcet extensions in settings with small numbers of candidates and committee seats. The findings reveal that Bloc voting generally fails to satisfy these Condorcet extensions. Moreover, the work quantifies the probability of adjacent winning committees under varying voter preference distributions, offering new empirical evidence for the normative evaluation of multiwinner electoral systems.
Application Category
📝 Abstract
We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent. We also analyze the results of pairwise contests between winning and losing candidates and assess when the winning coalitions satisfy several proposed extensions of the Condorcet criterion to multiwinner voting methods. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how frequently these coalitions arise under different assumptions about voter behavior.
Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
Bloc voting
Single-peaked preferences
Winning coalitions
Condorcet criterion
Multiwinner voting
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Bloc voting
single-peaked preferences
winning coalitions
Condorcet criterion
Monte Carlo simulations
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