The prospect of a fair outcome triggers prosocial behaviour in the Centipede Game

2026-09-30

AI Summary

This study investigates how equity sensitivity and social cognition interact to shape sequential interactive decision-making. Employing an incremental centipede game, the experiments introduce the revelation of uncertain equitable outcomes as a nudge mechanism, integrating analyses with the Social Value Orientation scale, the Cognitive Reflection Test, and evolutionary game models. Results demonstrate that fairness expectations significantly promote cooperative behavior, while repeated interactions reinforce strategic adaptation. Crucially, this mechanism effectively guides individuals who deviate from perfect rationality beyond self-interest toward mutually beneficial equilibria, with such individuals exhibiting stronger prosocial tendencies. Overall, this work provides novel insights into the evolution of cooperation under bounded rationality.

Abstract

Human decision-making reflects not only material incentives, but also concern for others' gains and the ability to understand others. However, the extent to which sensitivity to fairness interacts with aspects of social cognition and affects sequential social interactions requires further understanding. Here, we address this question through a behavioural experiment on sequential exchanges of resources, represented by the Incremental Centipede Game (ICG). The design comprises a "zero-end" treatment (n=164), where the ICG has a deadline yielding no payoff, and a "fair-end" treatment (n=162), where the last interaction leads to a fair outcome. The ICG, which is repeated twice, is complemented by two individual tasks: the Social Value Orientation task (SVO), to elicit social preferences, and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), to assess participants' deliberation. Our results show that the fair outcome, though uncertain, prompts participants to move beyond self-interest. Indeed, an evolutionary model shows that the fair split shifts play towards a mutually beneficial strategy when players are sufficiently prosocial and use probabilistic strategies. A second game repetition reinforces this pattern, with adaptation towards cooperation. Although CRT scores do not predict behaviour in the ICG, participants who deviate from game-theoretic rationality exhibit stronger prosociality in the SVO. Notably, in the fair-end treatment, some non-rational players are individualists, suggesting that the fair split may function as a nudge. In conclusion, our findings suggest that certain personal traits, such as social preferences, allow individuals to overcome self-interest to better align with their peers and achieve better collective outcomes in mixed-motive games.

Problem

• Centipede Game
• fairness sensitivity
• prosocial behaviour
• social cognition
• sequential social interactions

Innovation

• Incremental Centipede Game
• Prosocial behaviour
• Evolutionary model
• Social Value Orientation
• Fairness nudge