Quantum Attacks Targeting Nuclear Power Plants: Threat Analysis, Defense and Mitigation Strategies

2026-02-24

AI Summary

This study addresses the fundamental threat posed by quantum computers to industrial control systems in nuclear power plants, which can compromise operational safety and undermine digital forensic integrity. The work proposes the first “forensics-first” quantum resilience framework tailored for high-consequence infrastructure, systematically analyzing quantum attack surfaces across all layers of the Purdue Model and uncovering a forensics paradox induced by “quantum delayed decryption.” By integrating hybrid key exchange, cryptographic diversity, side-channel-resistant implementations, and secure time synchronization—aligned with ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST standards—the framework establishes a phased, defense-in-depth migration strategy. Risk modeling demonstrates that under current defenses, adversary success rates reach 78%, whereas the proposed approach significantly enhances quantum resilience, ensuring both physical safety and forensic reliability.

Technology Category

• Machine Learning: Quantum Machine Learning
• Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Qualitative Reasoning
• Computer Vision: Adversarial Attacks & Robustness

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Cyber-crime defenses and forensics
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Virtualization and resource management in Web systems and infrastructures

Abstract

The advent of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) presents a fundamental and existential threat to the forensic integrity and operational safety of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT) in critical infrastructure. This paper introduces a novel, forensics-first framework for achieving quantum resilience in high-consequence environments, with a specific focus on nuclear power plants. We systematically analyze the quantum threat landscape across the Purdue architecture (L0-L5), detailing how Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) campaigns, enabled by algorithms like Shor's, can retroactively compromise cryptographic foundations, undermine evidence admissibility, and facilitate sophisticated sabotage. Through two detailed case studies, \textsc{Quantum~Scar} and \textsc{Quantum~Dawn}, we demonstrate multi-phase attack methodologies where state-level adversaries exploit cryptographic monoculture and extended OT lifecycles to degrade safety systems while creating unsolvable forensic paradoxes. Our probabilistic risk modeling reveals alarming success probabilities (up to 78\% for targeted facilities under current defenses), underscoring the criticality of immediate action. In response, we propose and validate a phased, defense-in-depth migration path to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), integrating hybrid key exchange, cryptographic diversity, secure time synchronization, and side-channel resistant implementations aligned with ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST standards. The paper concludes that without urgent adoption of quantum-resilient controls, the integrity of both physical safety systems and digital forensic evidence remains at severe and irreversible risk.

Problem

• Quantum Attacks
• Nuclear Power Plants
• Industrial Control Systems
• Post-Quantum Cryptography
• Operational Technology

Innovation

• Post-Quantum Cryptography
• Forensics-First Framework
• Harvest-Now Decrypt-Later
• Industrial Control Systems
• Quantum Resilience