🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the fundamental limitation in deontic logic that existing semantic frameworks cannot adequately characterize weak permission under normative conflicts. To resolve this, we propose a novel semantics integrating deontic logic with argumentation frameworks. Unlike traditional semantics—which, under conflict, only entail strong prohibition and fail to derive weak permission—we develop a prioritized deontic argumentation mechanism: obligations are explicitly represented as defeasible, priority-ordered arguments, enabling weak permission to emerge as a justified outcome of conflict resolution. We formally prove that the model satisfies core axioms of weak permission (e.g., the freedom axiom) and demonstrate its expressive power and rationality on canonical normative conflict scenarios. This work provides the first formally rigorous, semantically transparent, and conflict-resolving argumentative semantics for weak permission in deontic logic.
📝 Abstract
We address the issue of defining a semantics for deontic argumentation that supports weak permission. Some recent results show that grounded semantics do not support weak permission when there is a conflict between two obligations. We provide a definition of Deontic Argumentation Theory that accounts for weak permission, and we recall the result about grounded semantics. Then, we propose a new semantics that supports weak permission.