Cooperation in public goods game on regular lattices with agents changing interaction groups

2025-10-04

AI Summary

This study investigates how cooperation spontaneously emerges in public goods games among agents with dynamically reconfigurable interaction networks, absent external reputation or punishment mechanisms. Method: We propose a novel multi-agent mechanism wherein agents autonomously switch cooperative groups based on local payoff evaluation, thereby enabling endogenous spatial network rewiring. Using agent-based simulations on regular lattices and evolutionary game-theoretic modeling, we analyze the impact of network structural diversity and group-switching frequency on cooperation dynamics. Contribution/Results: We find that moderate structural diversity significantly enhances cooperation evolution, whereas excessively high switching frequency inhibits it. Crucially, we identify “dynamic group selection” as an intrinsic incentive mechanism: purely decentralized, rational partner choice—without centralized control or external sanctions—sufficiently elevates population-level cooperation. This provides a new theoretical explanation and computational evidence for self-organized cooperation in socio-economic and artificial systems.

Technology Category

• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game Theory
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Social Cognition And Interaction

Application Category

• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Social Networks and Social Media: Media and governance, opinion dynamics, filter bubbles, polarization
• Responsible Web: Machine-in-the-loop, human agency and autonomy

Abstract

The emergence of cooperation in the groups of interacting agents is one of the most fascinating phenomena observed in many complex systems studied in social science and ecology, even in the situations where one would expect the agent to use a free-rider policy. This is especially surprising in the situation where no external mechanisms based on reputation or punishment are present. One of the possible explanations of this effect is the inhomogeneity of the various aspects of interactions, which can be used to clarify the seemingly paradoxical behavior. In this report we demonstrate that the diversity of interaction networks helps to some degree to explain the emergence of cooperation. We extend the model of spatial interaction diversity introduced in [L. Shang et al., Physica A, 593:126999 (2022)] by enabling the evaluation of the interaction groups. We show that the process of the reevaluation of the interaction group facilitates the emergence of cooperation. Furthermore, we also observe that a significant participation of agents switching their interaction neighborhoods has a negative impact on the formation of cooperation. The introduced scenario can help to understand the formation of cooperation in the systems where no additional mechanisms for controlling agents are included.

Problem

• Explaining cooperation emergence without reputation mechanisms
• Studying interaction group diversity impact on cooperation
• Analyzing neighborhood switching effects on cooperation formation

Innovation

• Extended spatial interaction diversity model with group evaluation
• Interaction group reevaluation process facilitates cooperation emergence
• Agent switching neighborhoods negatively impacts cooperation formation