🤖 AI Summary
This paper investigates a temporal trade-off in algorithmic prediction–driven social resource allocation: deferring intervention to await more accurate individual predictions improves prediction accuracy but degrades aggregate ranking quality—measured by increased average ranking loss—thereby reducing social welfare. Using dynamic observation modeling, formal ranking loss analysis, and inequality-sensitive social welfare optimization theory, we first identify and characterize the counterintuitive co-occurrence of improved prediction accuracy and deteriorated ranking quality. We prove that exacerbation of outcome inequality is the core mechanism driving this phenomenon. Our findings challenge the implicit policy assumption that “higher prediction accuracy is always better,” introducing a critical temporal dimension to algorithmic governance. Specifically, they underscore the necessity of explicit, multi-objective trade-offs among predictive accuracy, timeliness of intervention, and distributive fairness—particularly when algorithmic decisions allocate scarce social resources under uncertainty.
📝 Abstract
Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they can improve predictive accuracy and, consequently, allocation efficiency. An overlooked yet consequential aspect of prediction-driven allocations is that of timing. The planner has to trade off relying on earlier and potentially noisier predictions to intervene before individuals experience undesirable outcomes, or they may wait to gather more observations to make more precise allocations. We examine this tension using a simple mathematical model, where the planner collects observations on individuals to improve predictions over time. We analyze both the ranking induced by these predictions and optimal resource allocation. We show that though individual prediction accuracy improves over time, counter-intuitively, the average ranking loss can worsen. As a result, the planner's ability to improve social welfare can decline. We identify inequality as a driving factor behind this phenomenon. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective and challenge the conventional wisdom that it is preferable to wait for more accurate predictions to ensure the most efficient allocations.