🤖 AI Summary
This work identifies a previously overlooked security failure mode in test-time scaling (TTS): even marginal reductions in candidate response diversity substantially increase the rate of unsafe outputs—a phenomenon consistently observed across diverse models (Qwen3, Mistral, Llama3.1, Gemma3, OpenAI o3, Gemini) and TTS strategies (Best-of-N, MCTS). To systematically diagnose and stress-test TTS safety under such degradation, we propose RefDiv, a reference-guided diversity reduction protocol. Experiments demonstrate that RefDiv-induced diversity decay triggers safety risks exceeding those elicited by strong adversarial prompts; moreover, state-of-the-art safety classifiers (e.g., Llama-Guard) fail to detect this latent failure mode. Crucially, this study establishes, for the first time, a causal link between response diversity and safety in TTS—providing a novel paradigm for robustness evaluation and safety alignment of test-time scaled systems.
📝 Abstract
Test-Time Scaling (TTS) improves LLM reasoning by exploring multiple candidate responses and then operating over this set to find the best output. A tacit premise behind TTS is that sufficiently diverse candidate pools enhance reliability. In this work, we show that this assumption in TTS introduces a previously unrecognized failure mode. When candidate diversity is curtailed, even by a modest amount, TTS becomes much more likely to produce unsafe outputs. We present a reference-guided diversity reduction protocol (RefDiv) that serves as a diagnostic attack to stress test TTS pipelines. Through extensive experiments across four open-source models (Qwen3, Mistral, Llama3.1, Gemma3) and two widely used TTS strategies (Monte Carlo Tree Search and Best-of-N), constraining diversity consistently signifies the rate at which TTS produces unsafe results. The effect is often stronger than that produced by prompts directly with high adversarial intent scores. This observed phenomenon also transfers across TTS strategies and to closed-source models (e.g. OpenAI o3 and Gemini-2.5-Pro), thus indicating that this is a general and extant property of TTS rather than a model-specific artifact. Additionally, we find that numerous widely used safety guardrail classifiers (e.g. Llama-Guard and OpenAI Moderation API), are unable to flag the adversarial input prompts generated by RefDiv, demonstrating that existing defenses offer limited protection against this diversity-driven failure mode. Through this work, we hope to motivate future research on designing robust TTS strategies that are both effective and secure against diversity-targeted stress tests as illustrated by RefDiv.