Resume
Academic Achievements
- Received the Siebel Scholar Award in 2025
- Paper 'Generalized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learning Agent' accepted by Quantitative Economics (Special Issue for ESIF)
- Presented talk 'Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions' at INFORMS'25
- Presented work 'Information Design with Unknown Prior' at ITCS'25
- Co-organizing Workshop on Information Economics x LLMs at EC'25
Background
- Research spans economics, machine learning, and theoretical computer science
- Focuses on mechanism design and information design for learning-based decision-makers
- Motivated by the interplay between economic incentives and ML algorithms in real-world AI systems such as advertising auctions and recommender systems
- Currently a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research (New England) in the Economics and Computation group, hosted by Alex Slivkins
- Will join the School of Data Science at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen as an Assistant Professor in 2026