Srihari Govindan
Scholar

Srihari Govindan

Google Scholar ID: b525hiUAAAAJ
University of Rochester
Game TheoryMathematical Economics
Citations & Impact
All-time
Citations
365
 
H-index
10
 
i10-index
11
 
Publications
20
 
Co-authors
0
 
Contact
Resume (English only)
Academic Achievements
  • Published Papers:
  • - Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection: The Case of Generic Extensive-Form Games, 2024 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - O'Neill's Theorem for Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 2025 (joint with R. Laraki and L. Pahl)
  • - O'Neill's Theorem for PL Approximations, Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 2024 (joint with L. Pahl)
  • - Existence of Monotone Equilibria in Large Double Auctions, Theoretical Economics, 2024 (joint with P. Barelli)
  • - Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations, Review of Economic Studies, 2024 (joint with P. Barelli and R. Wilson)
  • - On Sustainable Equilibria, Journal of Economic Theory 2023 (joint with R. Laraki and L. Pahl)
  • - A Finite Characterization of Perfect Equilibria, Mathematical Programming Series B, 2021 (joint with I. Callejas and L. Pahl)
  • - Competition for a Majority, Econometrica 2014 (joint with P. Barelli and R. Wilson)
  • - Axiomatic Equiilbrium Selection in Generic Two-Person Games, Econometrica 2012 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - A Decomposition Algorithm for N-person Games, Economic Theory 2010 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Forward Induction, Econometrica 2009 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Global Newton Method for Stochastic Games, Journal of Economic Theory 2009 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Metastable Equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research 2008 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Refinements of Nash Equilibrium, New Palgrave 2008 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria, Theoretical Economics 2006 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Message Spaces for Perfect Correlated Equilibria, Economic Theory 2006 (joint with S. Chatterji)
  • - Essential Equilibria, PNAS 2005 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Robust Nonexistence of Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets, Journal of Mathematica Economics 2004 (joint with L-A Busch)
  • - Computing Nash Equilibria by Iterated Polymatrix Approximation, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2004 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - An Equivalent Definition of Stable Equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2003 (joint with J.-F. Mertens)
  • - Symmetry and p-Stability, International Journal of Game Theory 2003 (joint with A. von Schemde and B. von Stengel)
  • - A Short Proof of Harsanyi’s Purification Theorem, Games and Economic Behavior 2003 (joint with P. Reny and A. Robson)
  • - A Global Newton Method to Compute Nash Equilibria, Journal of Economic Theory 2003 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Structure Theorems for Game Trees, PNAS 2002 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Perfect Equilibrium and Lexicographic Beliefs, International Journal of Game Theory 2002 (joint with T. Klumpp)
  • - On Maximal Stable Sets of Bimatrix Games, International Journal of Game Theory 2001 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes, Econometrica 2001 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Game Forms, Econometrica 2001 (joint with A. McLennan)
  • - Forward Induction, Randomization, and Admissibility, Journal of Economic Theory 1998 (joint with A. Robson)
  • - Uniqueness of the Index for Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games, Economic Theory 1998 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Equivalence and Invariance of the Index and Degree of Nash Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior 1997 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - A Subgame Property of Stable Equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research 1996
  • - Sufficient Condition for Invariance of Essential Components, Duke Mathematics Journal 1995 (joint with R. Wilson)
  • - Every Stable Set Contains a Fully Stable Set, Econometrica 1995
  • - Stability and The Chain Store Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 1995
Research Experience
  • Position: Professor of Economics at the University of Rochester.
Background
  • Research Interests: Game Theory, Economic Theory; Bio: Professor of Economics at the University of Rochester.
Co-authors
0 total
Co-authors: 0 (list not available)