1. Strong Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Bounded Group Size. Forthcoming in The ACM Web Conference 2025 (WWW ‘25).
2. Determining Winners in Elections with Absent Votes. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI ‘24). Main Track. Pages 2816-2824.
3. Computational Complexity of Verifying the Group No-show Paradox. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI ‘24). Main Track. Pages 2958-2966.
4. Average Envy-freeness for Indivisible Items. In Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO ’23).
5. Accelerating Voting by Quantum Computation. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI ’23), in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 216:1274-1283.
6. The Wisdom of Strategic Voting. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ‘23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 885–905.
7. Anti-Malware Sandbox Games. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS ‘22). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 1201–1209.
Research Experience
4th-year Ph.D. student in Computer Science at Rutgers University, conducting research in areas such as computational social choice.
Education
Ph.D. student in Computer Science at Rutgers University-New Brunswick, co-advised by Prof. Lirong Xia and Prof. David Pennock; B.S. in Intelligence Science and Technology (Turing Honor Class) and B.Ec. dual degree in Economics from Peking University.
Background
Research Interest: computational social choice, information elicitation and aggregation, fair division, algorithmic game theory, intersection on large language model and social choice. Received a B.S. degree in Intelligence Science and Technology, as a member of Turing Honor Class, and a B.Ec. dual degree in Economics from Peking University.