Published numerous academic papers covering topics such as populist policymaking, common determinants of legislative and regulatory complexity, intertemporal evidence on the strategy of populism in the United States, more laws and more growth, economic insecurity and the demand for populism in Europe, power mismatch and civil conflict, attitudes towards migrants and pension systems, effective communication and preferences for redistribution in hard times, costly commitment: populism, economic performance, and the quality of bureaucracy, from Weber to Kafka: political instability and overproduction of laws, optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty, third-party intervention and strategic militarization, a theory of power wars, bureaucrats under populism, measuring discretion and delegation in legislative texts, dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization, redistributing income under proportional representation, global crises and populism, turnout across democracies, mediation and peace, the geography of inter-state resource wars, and strategic mass killings.
Research Experience
Director of the Pericles unit, former active member of the Council of the EEA, and currently chairs the Minorities in Economics (MinE) committee, with a growing passion for diversity and inclusion concerns.
Education
Obtained Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1996. Returned to Italy (Bocconi) in 2014 after teaching at multiple American universities, including Columbia University.
Background
Professor of Political Science and Economics, with a focus on bargaining, political economy, and economics of conflict. His current work also deals with causes and consequences of populism and law and economics in general.